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Appellant Lan England ("Plaintiff) respectuflly submits the following Reply Brief: 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Plaintiff has already set forth his statement of facts in this case and will not repeat that 
statement here. Plaintiff simply wishes to point out a few critical admissions and inaccuracies in 
the factual statement of Appellee Eugene Horbach ("Defendant"). 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff "conceded at trial that as of May 23,1991 Horbach had 
already overpaid the agreed stock purchase price." See Appellee's Brief, at p. 4. Defendant fails 
to acknowledge that any concession by Plaintiff was based on Plaintiffs assuming certain matters, 
which he disputed, for hypothetical purposes at Defendant's counsel's request. (R. 531-542). 
Though the lower court did not so find, Plaintiff maintains that he was not fully compensated for 
the stock when he met with the Defendant on May 23, 1991. Several of the payments which 
Defendant testified and the court apparently found were for this stock purchase, were in fact 
payments for services which the Plaintiff rendered to the Defendant, his company and Medicode-
-the company whose stock Defendant purchased--or were related to other stock purchases and 
deals between Plaintiff and the Defendant. (R. 485-87, 495-504). 
The court concluded that the Plaintiffs testimony was incredible because no 
documentation supported his claims that the extra payments were for services and other deals. 
While Plaintiff does not formally challenge this finding on appeal, he disputes the court's 
conclusion. It seems incredible that the court would expect documentation in this case. After 
all, Plaintiff had sold over a million dollars worth of stock to the Defendant without any 
documentation whatsoever. (R. 582) Plaintiff had always relied on Defendant's goodwill in 
keeping his promises. Defendant's willingness to keep his word, however, evaporated when he 
finally got his hands on Plaintiffs stock. He had what he wanted and his word was no longer 
good. 
The Defendant's story, by contrast, seems far more "incredible" than Plaintiffs. He asks 
the court to believe that by mere oversight he paid Plaintiff $170,000.00 more for the stock than 
agreed. His testimony that all the payments were for the stock and nothing else is contradicted 
by his own statements and conduct. In August of 1993, Defendant swore upon his oath in an 
affidavit, that he owed Plaintiff $25,000.00 on the stock purchase when they met in 1991. (R. 
134-36). Later in his deposition in November, 1993, he also acknowledged that he owed Plaintiff 
money for the stock at the May meeting. (Id.) 
Moreover, why would Defendant have agreed to give up 2% of the company's stock at 
the meeting unless he had breached the agreement by failing to make payments and still owed 
money. His own testimony indicates that he wanted the stock, and he signed the agreement and 
paid the money because he knew at the meeting he was not entitled to the stock. (R. 584-85). 
He had breached the agreement. 
Finally, Defendant suggests, but the court did not find, that the 2% agreement was simply 
security for the final payment. (R. 577). He asks the Court to believe that, contrary to the 
express language of the agreement which he drafted, his promise to hold 2% of the stock forever 
meant that he would hold it until the $25,000.00 payment cleared. He asks the court to believe 
that he pledged $400,000.00 in stock to secure a $25,000.00 payment. In short, Defendant's 
testimony was anything but credible, but the trial court bought it. 
Defendant concedes that Plaintiff believed that he was owed money at the May 23, 1991 
meeting. See Appellee's Brief, at p. 4. He also concedes that he gave "England an interest in 
2% of the Medicode stock." Id. In addition, Defendant admits that it was only on the basis of 
Defendant's promise to pay $25,000.00 and give Plaintiff 2% of the stock that Plaintiff agreed 
immediately to convey the stock to Defendant. Id. Thus, Defendant admits that he made 
promises to Plaintiff to secure delivery of the stock, which Plaintiff disputed he was entitled to 
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based on both the fact that Defendant had not paid for the stock in full and that the payments 
had been delayed, and that he later refused to honor those promises. 
Defendant suggests that Plaintiff cannot claim any prejudice based on the court's 
amending the pleadings to include a counterclaim. Id. at 6. However, the items of prejudice 
have been clearly set forth in Appellant's brief. See Appellant's Brief at p. 19. Defendant also 
argues that comments by counsel for Plaintiff show that Plaintiff knew that he was facing a 
counterclaim. The cited comments, however, affirmatively establish that Plaintiff believed the 
evidence of overpayment was being introduced and could only be considered in defense of 
Plaintiffs claim. Counsel for Plaintiff stated in opening argument: "there's been a recent defense 
raised that Mr. England was way overpaid for the stock in the amount of about $200,000.00." Id. 
at 6 (R. 450). Clearly, this statement establishes that Plaintiff believed that the evidence of 
overpayment would be introduced only to establish a defense to Plaintiffs claim. Counsel makes 
absolutely no mention of a pending counterclaim. 
Finally, Defendant suggests that by failing to object to the evidence of overpayment, 
Plaintiff consented to the amendment of the pleadings to include a counterclaim. That simply is 
not the case. Plaintiff was aware that the evidence would be introduced to establish a defense to 
his claim. He was wholly unaware that he faced the potential of a counterclaim. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that this court should "presume [the decision] of the lower court to be 
correct and search for grounds upon which [it] may be upheld." See Appellee's Brief at p. 10. 
However, case law clearly establishes that when a court reviews the application of the law to the 
facts, a lower court's decision is entitled to no presumption of correctness. See Kennecott Corp. v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 862 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Utah 1993). The Supreme Court has declared: "We 
accord a trial court's legal conclusions no deference but review them for correctness." Id. 
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(emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs appeal challenges the lower court's application of the law to 
the facts. Accordingly, the lower court's legal conclusions are entitled to no deference. 
L THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE DOES NOT PRECLUDE FINDING AN 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION IN THIS CASE. 
Defendant argues that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction cannot be applied to the 
facts of this case due to the parties "mutual mistake". See Appellee's Brief, p. 12. Defendant 
goes to some length to point out that Plaintiff makes no argument that the doctrine of mutual 
mistake should not apply. Accordingly, Plaintiff will show that the doctrine is wholly inapplicable 
in this case, and that its application constitutes legal error. Indeed, Plaintiff will show that 
acceptance of the lower court's ruling and Defendant's position on mutual mistake would 
virtually destroy the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, would go against clear precedent, and 
would encourage fraud. 
A. The Doctrine of Mutual Mistake Does Not Apply to Void an Accord and 
Satisfaction When the Mistake Concerns the Obligations of the Parties on the 
Underlying Agreement and Not the Terms of the Accord and Satisfaction. 
The trial court ruled that the May 23, 1991 agreement was unenforceable because it was 
executed under a mutual mistake of fact and was without consideration. (R. 441-42). Defendant 
contends that the doctrine of mutual mistake therefore precludes reversal of the trial court's 
ruling even if consideration supported the May 23, 1991 agreement. See Appellee's Brief at p. 
12. Defendant argues essentially that a mutual mistake regarding the obligation owing on the 
underlying contract operates to void an accord and satisfaction reached in settlement of the 
agreement. Defendant's position is not supported by authority and would eviscerate the doctrine 
of accord and satisfaction. 
"The legal principles underlying the doctrine of mutual mistake are well established. 
Where there has been a mistake between the parties as to the subject matter of a contract, there 
has been no meeting of the minds, and the contract is voidable at the election of the party 
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adversely affected." See LaFleur v. C.C. Pierce Co. Inc., 496 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Mass. 1986) citing 
13 S. Williston, Contracts § 1535 (1970) (emphasis added). The lower court's application of the 
doctrine in this case and Defendant's defense of that application defy logic and precedent. The 
lower court held in essence that because the parties were mutually mistaken with respect to the 
amount due and owing on the underlying contract there was no meeting of the minds and hence 
no accord and satisfaction. 
The court's ruling ignores the reality that there is rarely, if ever, a meeting of the minds 
with respect to the party's obligations on the underlying contract when parties enter an accord 
and satisfaction. That is precisely the reason for an accord and satisfaction-parties cannot come 
to a meeting of the minds as to what the obligations are under the contract. If a "mistake" or 
failure to come to a meeting of the minds as to the obligation due on an underlying contract 
voids an accord and satisfaction, the doctrine of accord and satisfaction is a legal nullity. 
The doctrine is designed to allow parties to a contract "to mutually agree that a 
performance different than that required by the original contract" and to substitute that 
performance for the performance originally agreed upon. Niederhauser Builders v. Campbell, 824 
P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added). The doctrine specifically contemplates 
that parties will not be able to come to a meeting of the minds as to the obligations on the 
underlying contract. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "where the underlying 
claim is disputed or uncertain, the obligor's assent to the definite statement of performance in 
the accord amounts to sufficient consideration." Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 
1369, 1372 (Utah 1980). To rule as the lower court did and as the Defendant asks this court to 
rule that a failure to come to a meeting of the minds as to the obligations due on the underlying 
contract because of a mutual mistake voids an accord and satisfaction, is to render the entire 
doctrine of accord and satisfaction null and void. After all, if parties can agree or come to a 
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meeting of the minds as to what is due under the underlying contract, there is no need to agree 
on a "substitute performance." 
Defendant cites the Niederhauser case as support for the lower court's conclusion that 
there is no enforceable accord and satisfaction in this case on the basis of a mutual mistake. 
That case, however, is clearly distinguishable and does not support the lower court's conclusion 
and Defendant's position. The Niederhauser court did not void the accord and satisfaction 
because the parties were mutually mistaken regarding the obligations due on the underlying 
contract. Rather, the court ruled that mutual mistake voided the accord and satisfaction there 
because the parties were mutually mistaken as to the terms of the accord and satisfaction. 824 
P.2d at 1198. Thus, mutual mistake voids an accord and satisfaction only if the parties to the 
accord and satisfaction are mutually mistaken as to tarns of the accord and satisfaction, and not if 
they are mutually mistaken as to the obligations on the underlying contract as the lower court ruled 
and Defendant contends. Here, there was no mutual mistake regarding the terms of the accord 
and satisfaction. Plaintiff agreed immediately to deliver the stock certificates to Defendant, 
despite the Defendant's failure to make timely payments. The Defendant in turn agreed to pay 
$25,000.00 and hold 2% of the Medicode stock in trust for Plaintiff. There is no mutual mistake 
regarding the terms of the accord and satisfaction. 
B. Application of Any Mistake Doctrines to the Facts of this Case Ignores the Well-
Established Rule that One's Position Need Not Be Well Founded in an Accord 
and Satisfaction. 
The Defendant's argument suggests that there can be no mistake, unilateral or mutual, 
with respect to the obligation on the underlying agreement or the accord and satisfaction is void. 
This position is clearly contrary to the well-recognized rule that consideration for an accord and 
satisfaction "may consist of a compromise of a bona fide dispute which is not necessarily well-
founded but is in good faith." In re Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 
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795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (emphasis added). Simply stated, case law establishes that a party 
may be mistaken about his or her position and still enter a binding accord and satisfaction. 
Defendant's position runs counter to this well-recognized rule. 
Moreover, adopting the lower court's conclusion as the law would establish a rule of law 
that encourages fraud. Defendant argues essentially that Plaintiffs position at the May 23,1991 
meeting, that he was still owed money, was mistaken and that because Defendant had agreed 
with Plaintiff that money was still owed a mutual mistake precludes this court from finding an 
accord and satisfaction. Consider for a moment the following hypothetical example which 
illustrates the danger in accepting Defendant's argument. 
Assume for the sake of argument, that Plaintiffs belief at the May 23, 1991 meeting that 
he was owed money was mistaken.1 Assume further that Defendant had disagreed with Plaintiff 
and taken the position that he had paid the full purchase price and demanded delivery, the 
position he later took at trial. It is undisputed that Plaintiff would not have delivered the stock 
to Defendant on that date under those circumstances. (R. 590). Plaintiff believed in good faith 
both that Defendant still owed him money and that Defendant had failed to pay within the 
agreed time period. (R. 491-94, 504-07, 517-18) Certainly in these circumstances the parties 
could have reach an accord and satisfaction, substituting the May 23, 1991 agreement as 
performance, in settlement of this dispute. 
Defendant argues, however, that because Defendant agreed with Plaintiff that money was 
owed, the agreement cannot be enforced. This makes no sense and would encourage fraud. A 
party in Defendant's position may, in actuality, disagree with the other party. However, rather 
1
 England acknowledges that this was the finding of the lower court, and England does not challenge this 
finding on appeal, not because England agrees with the finding but because there is not a sufficient basis to 
challenge the factual finding based on the record. England does, however, vehemently dispute that no money 
was owed him on this date. 
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than acknowledge the disagreement and settle with an accord and satisfaction, a party could 
agree with the other side, come to a mutually agreed resolution, obtain what was desired, and 
refuse to honor the promise because both parties were "mutually mistaken," and keep the fruits 
of his fraudulent promise. That is precisely what Defendant has done in this case, and the Court 
should correct this injustice. 
C The Doctrine of Mutual Mistake Does Not Apply Because the "Mistake" Did Not 
Concern a Basic Assumption of the Contract and Defendant Bore the Risk of 
Any Mistake. 
Courts and commentators have clearly held that a mutual mistake will not make a 
contract voidable unless the mistake concerns a basic assumption of the contract that has a 
material effect on the agreed exchange, and the party seeking avoidance must not have borne the 
risk of the mistake. See Public Util. Dist. v. Washington Public Power, 705 P.2d 1195 (Wash. 
1985), modified, 713 P.2d 1109 (Wash. 1986); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 152 (1981). 
Here, the mistake, if any, did not have a material effect on the agreed exchange, and Defendant 
bore the risk of any mistake. 
1. The Mistake With Respect to Whether Money Was Due Did Not Have a 
Material Effect on the Bargain. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts clearly provides that a mutual mistake must have 
a "material effect" on the agreed exchange or performances to void a contract. Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, § 152, (1981). Here the mistake with respect to whether purchase money 
was due did not have a "material effect" on the agreed exchange. Commentators have indicated 
that to show a 
material effect on the agreed exchange of performances a party must 'show more 
than a mere loss of advantage from the contract or that he would not have 
entered into it had there been no mistake/ He must show that the resulting 
imbalance in the agreed exchange is so severe that he can not fairly be required to 
carry it out. 
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E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 9.3 & nn. 19 (1982). Here there is no evidence that the agreed 
exchange was materially affected by the parties' belief that $25,000.00 was still owing on the 
underlying contract. 
Defendant testified that his real objective in entering the accord and satisfaction was to 
secure immediate delivery of the stock. (R. 138-39). According to his own testimony, he simply 
agreed to pay the $25,000.00 to expedite the transaction. (Id). The testimony suggests that if 
Defendant had known that the $25,000.00 was not owing, he still would have agreed to the terms 
of the accord and satisfaction. (Id.) He wanted the stock and was not entitled to it because of 
his failure to pay within the agreed time frame. The payment of the additional $25,000.00 did 
not materially affect the agreed upon exchange. Plaintiff gave up stock constituting 18.6% of the 
company, and Defendant agreed to hold 2% of the stock for Plaintiff. Given the value of the 
stock interest at stake on both sides of the accord and satisfaction, it is apparent that the 
$25,000.00 which was the subject of the mistake did not have a material effect on the agreed 
exchange. The $25,000.00 was of little or no consequence in this deal. This conclusion is borne 
out by the fact that the Plaintiff made no effort to undo the deal when the $25,000.00 check 
bounced. (R. 65-66). Moreover, because Defendant would have paid the $25,000.00 even if he 
had known or believed that he was not due to get the stock on that day, the alleged mutual 
mistake did not materially affect the parties agreed exchange. 
2. Plaintiff Bore the Risk of a Mistake with Regard to How Much Money 
Was Due. 
Section 152 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts also states that a mutual mistake 
will not void a contract if the party seeking to avoid the contract bears the risk of mistake. Here, 
the record reveals that Defendant bore the risk of mistake in this case. Section 154 of the 
Restatement provides for the allocation of the risk between parties and states in relevant part 
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that "[a] party bears the risk of a mistake when ... (b) he is aware, at the time the contract is 
made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates 
but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient, or (c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on 
the ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.w Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, § 154 (1981). Here, the provisions of both paragraphs (b) and (c) indicate that 
Defendant bore the risk of a mistake in this case. 
Defendant was clearly aware at the time of contracting that he had limited knowledge 
with respect to whether the purchase price of the stock had been paid in full. At trial, Defendant 
testified that when Plaintiff claimed that Defendant owed $25,000.00, he agreed. (R. 584-85). 
He did not call his accounting staff. (R. 585). In fact, he did nothing to verify whether any 
money was still owed. Thus, Defendant knew that he had limited knowledge with respect to the 
matter to which the mistake relates, and chose to proceed. He treated his limited knowledge as 
sufficient because he wanted the stock. He was free so to act. However, he cannot now avoid 
the parties' accord and satisfaction based on any mistake. 
In addition, it is reasonable in the circumstances of this case to assign the risk of mistake 
to Defendant. It was Defendant who wanted to secure the immediate delivery of the stock. (R. 
256, U10, 502-07, 584-85). It was Defendant who arranged the meeting with Plaintiff to conclude 
the stock sale. Moreover, it was Defendant who had paid the money and in whose possession 
the evidence establishing the alleged overpayment always rested. Finally, it was Defendant who 
had failed to pay for the stock within the agreed time frame. Thus, it is reasonable to assign the 
risk of a mistake with regard to the amount owing under the contract to Defendant. 
Accordingly, the lower court erred in ruling that the agreement was void under the doctrine of 
mutual mistake. 
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II. DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS THAT NO CONSIDERATION SUPPORTED THE 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION ARE CLEARLY WITHOUT MERIT. 
Defendant suggests that because the lower court found that the purchase price had been 
paid in full he had no "legitimate basis to refuse to deliver the stock." Defendant ignores two 
critical points. First, Plaintiff testified, and Defendant did not dispute, that Defendant had failed 
to pay for the stock within the agreed time period. (R. 490-91, 494, 506-07). Courts have held 
that an extension of time in which to make payments constitutes consideration. See Ludwick v. 
Bryant, 697 P.2d 858 (Kan. 1985). Because Plaintiff granted Defendant additional time to make 
the payments, there was clearly consideration. 
Second, Defendant ignores the fact that Defendant's failure to pay as agreed constituted a 
breach of the parties' agreement. Notwithstanding the breach, Plaintiff agreed to go forward 
with the transaction based on the accord and satisfaction. Plaintiffs surrender of his rights to sue 
for breach and his continuing with the deal in the face of Defendant's delay and breach clearly 
constituted consideration. Plaintiff suffered detriment and Defendant was benefitted. See Gasser 
v. Home, 557 P,2d 154, 155 (Utah 1976) (Any benefit to promisor and detriment to promisee is 
consideration). In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has declared that courts should uphold an 
accord and satisfaction "wherever possible." Sugaihouse Finance, 610 P.2d at 1372. 
"Consideration is often found in the obligor's agreement to alter the means or method of 
payment..." Id. Here, Plaintiff altered the payment schedule or the method of payment. 
Consideration was given. 
A* Plaintiffs Consideration Argument Is Not Raised for the First 
Time on Appeal. 
Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs consideration argument must fail are specious. 
First, Plaintiff clearly raised the argument in the lower court that there was consideration in this 
case based on the settlement of a dispute. See Plaintiffs Trial Brief (R. 233-34). Defendant's 
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argument that the consideration argument is raised for the first time is simply without merit. 
Indeed, Plaintiff specifically ask the court to find an accord and satisfaction in this case. (R. 
234). 
B. Although There is a Dispute, It Is Irrelevant to This Action That a Dispute Exists 
Defendant argues that there was no dispute and therefore that there can be no accord 
and satisfaction. That is simply not the case for two reasons. First there was a dispute. 
Defendant wanted immediate possession of the stock, and Plaintiff maintained that he was not 
entitled to it. That is a dispute. Neither party knew what exactly was due under the original 
contract. Plaintiff believed that $25,000.00 was due, and Defendant agreed to pay that amount 
and give Plaintiff 2% of the company's stock. (R. 584-85). Thus, the parties settled a dispute 
with respect to the immediate right to possession by entering an accord and satisfaction. 
More importantly, Plaintiff ignores the fact there does not have to be a "dispute" to find 
an accord and satisfaction. Certainly, settlement of a "dispute" is one example of a situation in 
which the doctrine of accord and satisfaction commonly arises and is applied. Utah courts have 
clearly indicated that when an underlying claim is "disputed" or uncertain, ... a definite statement 
of performance in the accord amounts to sufficient consideration." Sugarhouse Finance, 610 P.2d 
at 1372. Here the underlying claim was clearly "uncertain." Defendant wanted the stock but 
believed he still owed money and had failed to pay for the stock within the agreed time frame. 
(R. 577, 504). 
Moreover, as the Niederhauser court clearly held: "Accord and satisfaction arises when 
the parties to a contract mutually agree that a performance different than that required by the 
original contract will be made in substitution of the performance originally agreed upon and the 
substituted agreement calling for a different performance will discharge the obligation created 
under the original agreement." 824 P.2d at 1197. That is exactly what happened here. Under 
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the original agreement, Defendant was to pay Plaintiff the full purchase price in the first few 
months of 1990. (R. 490-91, 494). Defendant failed to perform. Nonetheless, he desired the 
stock certificates. Thus, at the May 23,1991 meeting the parties agreed to a "substitute 
performance." 
C Plaintiffs Position Was Not Wholly Baseless. 
Third, the parties' May 23, 1991 agreement did not constitute the compromise of a wholly 
baseless position. Even assuming that the purchase price had been paid in full by the May 23 
1991 meeting, the fact remained that Defendant had not paid within the time frame agreed. The 
uncontroverted evidence at trial showed that the consideration was to be paid within the first few 
months of 1990. (R. 490-91, 494, 506-07). Moreover, the evidence also showed that payments 
for the stock, even under Defendant's version of the facts, was not received until at least 
September, 1990. (R. 257, U 4). Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs position is baseless is 
belied by his own conduct in this matter and clear legal authority. 
Case law clearly establishes that late payments under a contract constitute a breach of the 
contract. See Pearce v. Shwiz, 270 P.2d 442, 444-45 (Utah 1954). Because Defendant had failed 
to pay as agreed, Plaintiffs position that he did not need to deliver the stock was not only in 
good faith, it was well-founded. Accordingly, there was consideration. 
For all intents and purposes, Defendant acknowledged the validity of Plaintiffs position 
that Plaintiff had no obligation to deliver the stock at the parties May 23, 1991 meeting. (R. 590) 
Thus, there was a legitimate controversy as to whether Defendant had a right to immediate 
delivery of the stock. Defendant himself acknowledged that Plaintiffs position was not baseless-
he was of the same opinion. 
Moreover, Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs position is baseless assumes that 
Plaintiffs position was based solely on his belief that he was owed additional money. This 
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assumption ignores one critical fact. In addition to the fact that he believed he was owed money, 
Plaintiff believed that Defendant had breached the original agreement by failing to make the 
payments within the agreed time frame. (R. 490-91, 494, 506-07). Indeed, one year prior to the 
May, 1991 meeting, Plaintiff testified that Defendant acknowledged that the payments had been 
slow and first mentioned giving Plaintiff 2-3% of the company as compensation. (R. 494) This 
testimony was wholly uncontroverted. Certainly, Plaintiff had a good faith basis for believing that 
Defendant had breached the original purchase agreement. Even assuming that he was owed 
nothing, the fact remained that the agreement had been breached by Defendant's failure to pay 
as agreed. This basis provides a solid foundation for Plaintiffs position that Defendant was not 
entitled to delivery of the stock. 
III. THIS COURT CAN PROPERLY REVERSE ON THE BASIS OF PLAINTIFF'S 
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT. 
Plaintiff concedes that the estoppel argument was not raised before the trial court. 
However, that should not prevent its consideration and application in this case for three reasons. 
A. There Is Good Reason Why the Estoppel Defense Was Not Raised Before the 
Trial Court. 
First, it is ironic that the Defendant admonishes this court not to consider or rely on the 
legal theory of estoppel raised for the first time on appeal when one considers that the basis the 
trial court relied on for refusing to enforce the May 23, 1991 agreement-mutual mistake-was 
never raised by the Defendant in any pleading, his trial brief, or in opening or closing arguments. 
The lower court applied the doctrine of mutual mistake sua sponte to void the accord and 
satisfaction entered on May 23, 1991. Perhaps if Plaintiff could have anticipated that the court 
would use the doctrine of mutual mistake to find that no consideration supported the accord and 
satisfaction, Plaintiff may have considered raising the theory of estoppel to respond to the court's 
finding of no consideration on the grounds of mutual mistake. However, because the argument 
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had not been raised by Defendant and because, as discussed above, it has no application in this 
case, Plaintiff did not anticipate the necessity for making such an argument. Indeed, that 
Defendant did not believe the doctrine was relevant in this case is evidenced by his failure to 
raise it. 
B. This Is An Appropriate Case in Which to Consider an Item Raised for the First 
Time on Appeal. 
Failure to raise an issue in the trial court does not preclude its consideration on appeal. 
Utah courts have clearly held that matters raised for the first time on appeal can and should be 
considered in some circumstances. In State v. Cook, 881 P.2d 913, 914 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) cert. 
denied, P.2d (Utah 1995), this Court declared that "Utah's appellate courts have 
evidenced a willingness to hear and rule on issues 'raised for the first time on appeal [if] the trial 
court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances/" Id. at 914. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that appellate courts have some discretion to 
consider a matter raised for the first time on appeal. In Romrell v. Zions Fiist Natl Bank, 611 
P.2d 392 (Utah 1980), the appellant not only failed to raise the issue below but failed to raise it 
on appeal until filing a reply brief. Nonetheless, the court held that it had discretion to "decide 
the case upon any points that its proper disposition may require, even if first raised in a reply 
brief." Id. at 395. 
This is an appropriate case in which to consider this issue raised for the first time on 
appeal. One of the most widely recognized exceptions to the rule precluding the raising of an 
issue for the first time on appeal is if the issue presents a question of law. See, e.g. Frink v. Prod, 
643 P.2d 476, 477 (Cal. 1982). Here, the estoppel argument presents a legal question. The facts 
of the case are in evidence. The court must only determine whether, as a matter of law, the 
theory applies in this case. 
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In addition, this case involves plain error. It was plain error for the court to hold that the 
parties did not enter an accord and satisfaction on the grounds of mutual mistake. See Section I, 
infra. As discussed above, to so rule is completely to ignore the well-settled rule that a dispute 
need not be well-founded to be the subject of an accord and satisfaction. The court plainly failed 
to apply this principle. 
Furthermore, this case involves exceptional circumstances. This is not a case in which the 
complaining party simply failed to raise a legal theory to support its claim before the trial court. 
The estoppel theory, which Defendant contends Plaintiff should not be able to raise on appeal, is 
relevant and necessary only in response to the court's ruling that the doctrine of mutual mistake 
voids the accord and satisfaction. The doctrine of mutual mistake, however, had never been 
raised by Defendant or anticipated by Plaintiff.2 To require a party to anticipate that a court will 
raise a legal theory not presented by the other side to decide a case, and require a response to 
that legal theory, is inequitable. Because the court raised the doctrine of mutual mistake sua 
sponte3, Plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to raise the estoppel theory. This is precisely 
the kind of case in which it makes sense to reach an issue raised for the first time on appeal. 
Finally, and most importantly, the Utah Supreme Court appears to have considered an 
estoppel argument in response to a failure of consideration argument in an accord and 
satisfaction when raised for the first time on appeal. In Sugarhouse Finance, the Supreme Court 
2
 Plaintiff has argued previously that to hold that the doctrine of mutual mistake voids the accord and 
satisfaction on these facts completely ignores the fact that an accord and satisfaction arises when the parties 
agree to settle a dispute in good faith. If a mutual mistake regarding the nature of the dispute voids an accord 
and satisfaction, the parties cannot in reality settle such disputes. They are bound by the terms of the original 
agreement and must ask a court to determine what the rights of each party are. 
3
 The first mention of the doctrine of mutual mistake in this case is in the court's decision. Horbach did 
raise the doctrine of unilateral mistake in his trial brief, but had not raised it previously. Because the trial 
brief was presented the day of trial, England had no way of raising the estoppel argument in response to the 
brief. 
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held that the doctrine of estoppel could be applied to sustain an accord and satisfaction 
challenged on the ground that no consideration supported the agreement. 610 P.2d at 1372. The 
trial court had ruled that there was consideration to support the accord and satisfaction. 
Absolutely no indication is given that an estoppel argument was raised below. Notwithstanding, 
it appears from the case that the argument was raised for the first time by the court on appeal. 
See id. at 1373. Accordingly, the court here should not refuse to consider Plaintiffs estoppel 
argument. 
C. Contrary to Defendant's Assertion, Plaintiff Has Demonstrated Detrimental 
Reliance. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not rely on Defendant's promise to his detriment. 
Again, Defendant ignores the fact that Plaintiffs legal obligation to deliver the stock was 
"questionable." Even assuming that the full purchase price had been paid, the uncontradicted 
evidence showed that Defendant did not pay in the agreed time frame. Plaintiff testified, and 
Defendant did not dispute in any way, that the full purchase price was due in the first quarter of 
1990. (R. 490-91, 494, 500-09) The evidence showed that Defendant failed to so perform. It is 
axiomatic that failure to pay a contractual obligation in the time frame agreed constitutes breach 
of a contract. See, e.g., Pearce, 270 P.2d 442, 444-45. Thus, Plaintiffs legal obligation to deliver 
the stock was questionable at best. 
Plaintiff suffered significant detriment due to Defendant's promise. He delivered the 
stock when he believed he had no obligation to do so. He gave up his right to rescind the 
agreement and sue for breach based on Defendant's late payments and rights to sue for damages 
as a result of Defendant's delay in making payments. Defendant promised to give Plaintiff 2% of 
the company's stock so that he could acquire the stock on May 23,1991. He should not be able 
to keep the stock and refuse to honor his promise. 
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D. Defendant Was Aware of the Material Facts. 
Finally, the court must reject Defendant's specious argument that he cannot be estopped 
because he was not aware of all the material facts. Defendant was aware of all the material facts. 
He knew that he had made several payments to Plaintiff for the stock. He knew what he had 
agreed to pay for the stock. 
Moreover, at the very least, he was aware that he did not know for sure whether he still 
owed Plaintiff money. Nonetheless, because he wanted the stock immediately, he determined to 
proceed. Thus, Defendant proceeded at the very least with "conscious disregard" of his lack of 
knowledge. He cannot therefore be heard to complain that he was unaware of the material facts. 
He treated his lack of knowledge as sufficient and thus assumed the risk of any lack of 
knowledge of a material fact. See Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 135, 141 n.8 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 154 (1981). 
IV. THE TRIAL ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND THE 
PLEADINGS TO INCLUDE A COUNTERCLAIM. 
Defendant concedes that the first mention of his intention to pursue a counterclaim at 
trial was in his trial brief delivered to Plaintiff on the day of trial. See Appellee's Brief, at p. 6. 
Defendant also concedes that he had asked the court for leave to file a counterclaim days before 
the first trial date and that his request was denied. See Appellee's Brief, at p. 5. However, 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff consented to the inclusion of a counterclaim in this matter by 
failing to object at trial to the introduction of the evidence of overpayment. Defendant's position 
is mistaken. 
A. Plaintiff Does Not Raise His Objection to the Inclusion of the Counterclaim for 
the First Time on Appeal as Defendant Contends. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that no objection was raised to the introduction of the evidence of 
overpayment during trial. However, the objection was raised before the trial court. (R. 247, 11 
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7). Plaintiff clearly pointed out to the trial court that no consent, express or implied, was given 
to try the issue of overpayment in his objection to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Thus, Plaintiff raised this issue before the trial court, and the Defendant's argument that the 
issue is presented for the first time on appeal is without merit 
B. Plaintiff Did Not Consent to the Inclusion of a Counterclaim in This Matter and 
Any Failure to Object to the Introduction of the Evidence Does Not Operate as 
Consent, Express or Implied, on the Unusual Facts of This Case. 
Defendant suggests that Plaintiff consented to the amendment of the pleadings to include 
a counterclaim by failing to object to the introduction of the evidence of overpayment. As 
support for the proposition, Defendant cites several cases in which courts have followed the well-
established rule that a party consents to the trial of an issue if the party permits the issue to be 
tried without objection despite the fact that the issue is not in the pleadings. However, this case 
presents a factual situation much different than those presented by the cases Defendant cites.4 
Generally, the failure to object to evidence that goes to an issue not in the pleadings 
operates as consent because the evidence clearly relates only to that issue and failure to object is 
4
 Defendant cites three cases, all of which are clearly distinguishable. In General Ins. Co v. 
Camicero, 545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976), the court amended the pleadings to conform to the evidence 
when the defendant raised an affirmative defense, not a counterclaim, to the Plaintiffs complaint. 
The evidence which was not objected to established only the affirmative defense and related to no 
other issue at trial. Thus, failure to object clearly constituted implied consent to the trial of the issue. 
Defendant also cites Loader v. Scott Constr. Corp., 681 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1984). Again, this 
case involves an affirmative defense, not a counterclaim, and the evidence related only to the 
affirmative defense and no other issue at trial. Because Loader and Carnicero involve situations far 
different from the case at bar, they provide little, if any, guidance as to how the court should deal 
with this case. 
The final case cited by Defendant, Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Mktg., Ltd, 753 P.2d 507, 
(Utah App. 1988), actually supports Plaintiffs position. In Lloyd's, the plaintiff sued to recover 
commissions. On the second day of trial, evidence was introduced without objection to support a 
defense that had not been raised before trial. Id. at 508-09. Following the conclusion of the trial, 
the Plaintiff asked the court to permit amendment of its complaint to address the defense raised at 
trial. Id. at 509. The lower court denied the post-trial motion, and the Plaintiff appealed. Id. This 
court held that the Plaintiff had not been given an adequate opportunity to respond to the newly 
raised defense, despite its failure to object to the evidence. Id. at 511. The court remanded for 
further proceedings. Id. 
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clear evidence of consent. Here, however, there was no consent to the inclusion of a 
counterclaim. Plaintiff was aware that evidence of overpayment was to be introduced as a 
defense. See (R. 354). However, he did not believe that the evidence was being introduced to 
pursue a counterclaim, as evidenced by counsel's statement in opening argument: "Now, 
unfortunately, there's been a recent defense raised that Mr. England was way overpaid for the 
stock in the amount of about $200,000.00 ...." Id. Clearly, counsel did not believe that a 
counterclaim was before the court. This belief was reasonable in light of the fact that the court 
had expressly ruled three months previous that no counterclaim could be pursued. See (R. 199). 
The court should note that the overpayment issue had not been raised even as a defense 
in the pleadings. However, Plaintiff learned just before trial that the evidence of overpayment 
would be introduced to establish Defendant's defense of lack of consideration. Plaintiff did not, 
therefore, object to the introduction of the evidence because Plaintiff knew that the evidence 
would be introduced to establish Defendant's defense. 
Significantly, Defendant fails to identify a single case in which a court has permitted the 
amendment of the pleadings to include a counterclaim at trial. While courts have permitted 
amendments to previously pled counterclaims, careful research reveals no precedent for 
permitting a party to amend the pleadings to include a counterclaim that is raised at trial. 
Defendant suggests that Plaintiffs citation of several cases in which appellate courts have upheld 
a lower court's refusal to allow a counterclaim to be interposed on the eve of trill is unpersuasive 
because those cases "merely upheld the trial courts' exercise of discretion in denying motions to 
amend." See Appellee's Brief, at p. 21, n.18. These cases, however, clearly establish that 
counterclaims cannot generally be interposed in a proceeding on the eve of trial. If they cannot 
be raised on the eve of trial, certainly they should not be raised during trial. Moreover, the 
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appellate court's upholding the actions of the lower courts' in the cited cases establishes that 
those courts ruled correctly and that the lower court here erred. 
Defendant attempts to trivialize the importance of Trafton v. Yongblood, 442 P.2d 648 
(Cal. 1968), but the fact remains that it is the closest case to the case at bar identified by either 
party and clearly supports the conclusion that the lower court erred in permitting the Defendant 
to amend the pleadings to include a counterclaim. It is beyond dispute that the factual situation 
presented here is unique. Seldom if ever will the evidence necessary to establish a counterclaim 
be identical to the evidence necessary to establish an affirmative defense. In those rare cases, a 
party will not generally raise the affirmative defense but fail to raise the counterclaim and thus 
squarely present the issue. In Trafton, however, and this case, that is exactly what happened. 
The defendant in Trafton had pled an affirmative defense and the evidence of this defense also 
established a counterclaim against the Plaintiff. The Defendant, however, did not plead the 
counterclaim. Id. at 652-53. The evidence establishing both the defense and the counterclaim 
was received without objection. After the trial, the Defendant moved to amend the pleadings to 
conform to the evidence to include the counterclaim. The court denied the motion, and the 
Supreme Court of California affirmed. See id. at 653, 658. 
Defendant attempts to distinguish the Trafton case by pointing to two differences between 
that case and the case at bar. The distinctions, however, are of no legal consequence. First, 
Defendant observes that the motion to amend the pleadings to include a counterclaim in Trafton 
was not made until after trial. Utah courts have clearly indicated that motions to amend the 
pleadings to conform to the evidence brought during trial will be treated the same as such 
motions brought after trial. See Ebbeit v. Ebbeit, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 765 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). Thus, the Trafton case is as applicable to a motion brought at the end of 
trial as it is to a motion brought after trial. 
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Next, the Plaintiff suggests that the case is inapposite because it merely affirmed the trial 
court's denial of the motion to amend. See Appellee's Brief, at p. 22. Defendant focuses on this 
distinction is perplexing. Defendant suggest that because the trial court affirmed a denial of a 
motion virtually identical to the motion that the lower court granted in this case, the case is 
distinguishable. To the contrary, the only distinction between the Trafton case and this case is 
the decision of the lower court. In Trafton, the lower court properly denied the motion to amend 
to include a counterclaim. Here, by contrast, the lower court granted the motion. Thus, the 
decision of the California Supreme Court on appeal firmly establishes that the lower court in 
Trafton decided this issue correctly while the lower court here did not. Thus, Defendant's 
distinction related to the lower court's action only serves to emphasize the fact that the lower 
court here erred. 
C An Additional Ground Exists For Reversing the Counterclaim. 
An additional ground exists for reversing the counterclaim. Defendant recovered nearly 
$170,000.00 because his payments for the stock allegedly exceeded the amount due under the 
contract. Plaintiff has argued, however, that an accord and satisfaction was entered by the parties 
on May 23, 1991. If the court rules that in fact the parties entered an accord and satisfaction, 
the Defendant cannot recover any overpayment on the underlying contract. To permit such 
enforcement of the underlying contract is contrary to clear authority regarding the legal effect of 
an accord and satisfaction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and the Appellant's Opening Brief, the Plaintiff respectfully 
requests that the court reverse the judgment of the lower court and rule that the parties entered 
an accord and satisfaction or that Defendant is estopped from denying his promise to deliver 2% 
of the stock of the company. The defendant also requests that the court reverse the court's 
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ruling permitting the presentation of a counterclaim below and vacate the judgment based 
thereon. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 3 - day of March, 1995. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Samuel DoMcVey 
Rartdy T. Austin 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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